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FLYING WITH BLINDERS ON-THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ALLOWS TSA TO IGNORE
EVIDENCE UNFAVORABLE TO ITS
FINANCIAL INTERESTS
ALLYN E. HURLEY*
T HE CONFLICT between government intrusion and private
interest is a timeless issue that shows no signs of disappear-
ing any time soon. The aviation industry is no exception to this
struggle. Any time the government is able to dictate the amount
of funds owed to it in return for its required services, there is
certain to be not only resistance on the part of the affected pri-
vate entities, but lasting legal and economic implications as well.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created
in response to the 2001 attacks on the United States, and it
seized control of airport security from commercial airlines, re-
quiring the airlines to pay fees for these security services.' Al-
though commercial airlines may be paying too much for these
government-imposed services or, at the very least, TSA may be
taking advantage of the deferential advantage given to them by
the courts to shirk their task of fully vetting all of the available
evidence in determining airline fees, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit) held in Southwest Airlines
Co. v. Transportation Security Administration (Southwest I) that TSA
was justified in relying on its consultant's estimate in imposing
security fees.' But the dissent correctly noted that TSA chose
one of two conflicting sets of data without "articulat[ing] a satis-
factory explanation" for that choice, and it failed to explain "a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice
* Allyn E. Hurley is a candidate forJuris Doctor at the SMU Dedman School of
Law. She is expected to graduate in 2013. She graduated with a Bachelor of
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I Sw. Airlines Co. v. Transp. Sec. Admin. (Southwest I1), 650 F.3d 752, 753-54
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
2 Id. at 757.
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made."3 Failing to require TSA to make such a connection dur-
ing the administrative proceedings allows TSA to favor the data
that leads to a larger government windfall.
Prior to September 11, 2001, commercial airlines handled the
screening of persons and property passing through U.S. air-
ports.4 However, in response to the terrorist attacks, the federal
government stepped in and created TSA to take over the secur-
ity function of airports.5 Accordingly, TSA has the authority
under 49 U.S.C. § 44940(a) (2) to impose air carrier fees, which
are intended "to pay for the costs of providing civil aviation se-
curity services."' 6 Section 44940(a) (2) (B) (i) limits these fees to
the amounts airlines paid "for screening passengers and property"
in 2000.' TSA initially determined these fees by relying on data
submitted by the airlines; however, suspicions that airlines were
taking advantage of the system and "low-balling" their 2000 costs
led Congress to order an independent review conducted by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO)." The GAO found
that screening costs in 2000 were $448 million, over 40% more
than the airlines had initially claimed.' "Numerous airlines"
filed petitions for review of TSA's final orders, alleging that the
fee increases contradicted 49 U.S.C. § 44940(a) (2).'o
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the airlines' determination that
the fees had been improperly calculated because the GAO's esti-
mate was based on incorrect variables and, thus, too high.11 The
discrepancy was due to the inclusion of costs associated with
screening non-passengers in 2000, disregarding the statute's lan-
guage. 2 The court remanded the issue to TSA to recalculate
the screening costs, excluding those from non-passengers. 3
3 Id. at 759-60 (Brown, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 753.
5 Id.
6 49 U.S.C. § 44940(a)(2) (2006).
7 49 U.S.C. § 44940(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). "The amounts of fees col-
lected under this paragraph for each fiscal year may not exceed... amounts paid
in calendar year 2000 by carriers described in subparagraph (A) for screening
passengers and property, as determined by the Under Secretary [of Transporta-
tion for Security]."




12 Id. at 754. In 2000, people were allowed to drop off and pick up friends and
family at the gate, which explains the higher volume of non-passengers. Id. at
760 n.3.
13 Id. at 754.
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The difficulties in determining the true screening costs led both
the airlines and TSA to commission consultants.'4 As might be
expected, the consultants' findings were contradictory and
clearly favored their respective clients' financial interests. TSA
hired Simat, Helliesen & Eichner, Inc. (SH&E), and found that
the screening costs for 2000 were $420 million; Campbell Avia-
tion Consultants (Campbell), hired by the airlines, concluded
that the cost was only $305 million. 15 The Campbell report pri-
marily relied on a report by the Department of Transportation
(DOT), indicating the number of individuals screened in the
U.S. in 2000.16 The SH&E report did not refer to this DOT fig-
ure, instead relying on "airport survey data" and "interviews with
airport and government officials." 7 TSA-not surprisingly-
"found SH&E's report more persuasive,' but beyond stating
that SH&E used "more extensive methodology,"1 failed to ex-
plain why.
The airlines challenged TSA's remand decisions, charging
that this decision was "arbitrary and capricious because TSA
should not have relied on the SH&E report... or at least should
have more fully explained why it rejected the ... Campbell re-
port. ' 2° On the appeal following remand, a divided three-judge
panel of the D.C. Circuit held that TSA acted reasonably, and
not arbitrarily and capriciously, by relying on the SH&E report,
and therefore the airlines' petitions for review were denied.2
The majority reasoned that, because determining the percent-
age of passenger and non-passenger screenings was such a diffi-
cult and imprecise task, TSA was justified in choosing the SH&E
estimates because SH&E conducted a "thorough inquiry" and
"deriv[ed] data from several independent sources. ' 22 Further-
more, the court's decision seemed to hinge on the fact that it
should pay deference to TSA's decision so long as TSA "ade-
quately consider[ed] contradictory evidence" and met its bur-
den by reasonably explaining that the SH&E report was more
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 755.
17 Id. at 754.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 756.
20 Id. at 755.
21 Id. at 757-58.
22 Id. at 755, 757.
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detailed and reliable than the Campbell report.2 The dissent
argued that "[a]lthough TSA's calculation of security fee is enti-
tled to broad deference," that deference is not absolute. 24 The
dissent specifically took issue with the fact that TSA gave "no
reason for choosing" one consultant's estimate over another.25
The dissent argued that without sufficient reasoning behind
TSA's decision, it is not entitled to complete deference in its
decision making in this case.26
Upon its review of TSA's determination, the majority dis-
cussed the degree of deference a court should give to an
agency's administrative decisions when that agency must con-
sider a contradictory body of evidence.27 The majority followed
the standard in American Wrecking Corp. v. Secretary of Labor28 and
echoed the rationale in the previous Southwest Airlines Co. v.
Transportation Safety Administration (Southwest 1)29 decision to de-
termine the 2000 screening costs, saying that "when an agency
'adequately considers contradictory evidence . . .our standard
of review does not permit a reviewing court to displace the
[agency's] choice between conflicting views.' ,,3 0 Specifically, the
majority, quoting Southwest I, said that it "will not second-guess
TSA's determination of [an] obscure calculation in a 'data-poor
environment' in which '[a] ny decision ... would have required
considerable guesswork.' ,,3' The majority reasoned that TSA's
decision was entitled to strong deference due to the statutory
language stating that the fees are "based on the amount TSA
'determined' the airlines paid in 2000. ' '32
Next the majority examined the airlines' contention that TSA
overlooked a possibly important figure in the DOT report by its
complete, yet vague, rejection of the Campbell report.33 The
majority emphasized that TSA adequately addressed the DOT
figures by criticizing the Campbell report as a whole due to its
23 Id. at 756 (quoting Am. Wrecking Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 351 F.3d 1254,
1261 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
24 Id. at 758 (Brown, J., dissenting).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 760.
27 Id. at 756.
28 Am. Wrecking, 351 F.3d at 1261.
29 Sw. Airlines Co. v. Transp. Sec. Admin. (Southwest 1), 554 F.3d 1065, 1073
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
30 Southwest II, 650 F.3d at 756 (quoting Am. Wrecking, 351 F.3d at 1261).
31 Id. (quoting Southwest I, 554 F.3d at 1073).
32 Southwest II, 650 F.3d at 756; see 49 U.S.C. § 44940(a) (2) (B) (i) (2006).
3 Southwest II, 650 F.3d at 756.
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unreliability and limited nature; 4 however, in rehashing the
TSA decision, the court never elaborated on why or how TSA
came to these conclusions. The majority contended that the air-
lines gave no reason to believe the DOT evidence was reliable,
which, according to the majority, was apparently necessary be-
cause the figure was based on an industry report and not an
independent audit.3 5 Specifically, the majority speculated that
the DOT figure was likely inflated due to pre-9/11 incentives for
airlines to "aim high" on their screening estimations, making
such numbers "shaky," influenced, and unreliable. 6 Thus, the
court found that TSA was justified in ignoring the DOT figure. 7
Finally, the majority reasoned that because "there was no au-
thoritative source for the number of airport screenings during
the year 2000," TSA was within its rights to rely solely on the
SH&E report; TSA adequately and reasonably explained that
the SH&E report was more detailed and reliable than the Camp-
bell report, thus fulfilling the standard in American Wrecking."
The majority then dismissed the airlines' three other arguments
(not discussed here) and concluded that there was not sufficient
reason to overturn TSA's decision. 9 However, though the major-
ity engaged in this extensive analysis on the merits and weak-
nesses of the two conflicting reports, it is important to note that
TSA did not articulate such analysis in its decision.40
Judge Brown's dissent first took issue with TSA's failure to
make reference to the DOT figure at all, accusing it of imper-
missibly ignoring contradictory evidence. 41 Brown further ar-
gued that though entitled to a degree of deference, TSA is not
entitled to unlimited judicial deference in its decisions. 2 Even
if the majority was correct that TSA implicitly rejected the DOT
data by rejecting the Campbell report, Brown argued that TSA
still articulated no reasoned factual basis in its opinion as to why
the Campbell report and, by extension, the DOT data, were not
appropriate to include in the fee estimate.4 Brown identified
several cases requiring agencies to reasonably explain and show
34 Id.
35 Id. at 757.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 756-57.
39 Id. at 757-58.
40 Id.; see also id. at 760 (BrownJ., dissenting).
41 Id. at 758-59 (Brown, J., dissenting).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 758-60.
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"a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made" when a contrary body of evidence exists, and he argued
that TSA failed to engage in this process.44
The D.C. Circuit's holding in Southwest II sets a potentially
dangerous and worrisome precedent in the area ofjudicial over-
sight of government agencies. Part of the majority's argument is
based on the deference the court should purportedly give to an
agency's choice between conflicting evidence, specifically invok-
ing 49 U.S.C. § 44940 (a) (2) (B) (i) as authority. 45 Even if the
court finds through reasoned analysis that an agency was correct
in its conclusory determination, D.C. Circuit precedent still re-
quires the agency to adequately analyze and consider the contra-
dictory evidence.46
The case law on which the majority relied clearly indicates
that the court should defer whenever an agency "adequately
considers contradictory evidence. 47 The issue then is whether
TSA "adequately" considered the evidence of both the Campbell
report and the SH&E report. Adequate consideration meriting
the court's deference would have been shown had TSA provided
a rational line of reasoning for rejecting the DOT's estimate.48
Although the majority and TSA repeatedly stated that the Camp-
bell report was inferior, apparently because it was based on lim-
ited data, they never explained or gave evidence as to why the
data were limited or how the Campbell data were inferior.49
Specifically, the court gave no explanation for TSA's choice be-
yond the following:
TSA conducted a thorough review of the Campbell report that
included an examination of both the data and methodologies
utilized to construct the report findings. TSA concluded that the
Campbell report and findings were insufficient for further con-
sideration due to the report's use of limited data and broad, sim-
plistic methodologies that did not consider the full spectrum of
specific cost categories.5 °
44 Id. at 759 (citing Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety &
Health Admin., 626 F.3d 84, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2010); AT&T Wireless Servs. v. FCC,
270 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
45 Southwest II, 650 F.3d at 756.
46 Id. at 760.
47 Id. at 756; Am. Wrecking Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 351 F.3d 1254, 1261 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
48 Southwest II, 650 F.3d at 761.
49 Id. at 758.
50 Id. at 758-59.
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Both International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Mine
Safety & Health Administration and AT&T Wireless Services v. FCC
held that relying solely on the agency's knowledge and expertise
to dismiss contradictory evidence was arbitrary and capricious,
and thus not entitled to a deferential review by the courts.5'
The D.C. Circuit also stated in AT&T that an "agency [is re-
quired] to 'examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfac-
tory explanation for its action including a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.'- 52 Here, there is
nothing to indicate TSA ever engaged in this required articula-
tion of why the SH&E report was preferable to the Campbell
report, but instead merely concluded that it was.53
TSA's decision, as well as the majority's assessment of that de-
cision, also did not adequately consider that the two consultants'
reports focused on different things, both important in determin-
ing the most accurate estimate of the screening Costs. 54 TSA
purportedly took issue with the Campbell report's "failure to
'consider the full spectrum of specific cost categories'" that the
SH&E report gave in a "sophisticated analysis. '55 However, once
again, in its wholesale adoption of the TSA decision, the court
did not give any reasonable basis or even a shred of evidence for
this conclusory assessment. 56 Additionally, even if the Campbell
report was not perfect in isolation, it may have contained data,
such as the DOT estimates of numbers of persons screened,
that, in combination with the SH&E data, would have produced
the most accurate and fair estimate of screening costs. 57 The
dissent pointed out that TSA likely did not understand this "fun-
damental difference" in the reports since it did not devote any
attention to discussing or even pointing out this difference-
another indication that they never "adequately" considered this
contradictory evidence as required by precedent in the D.C. Cir-
cuit.58 Without TSA's explanation of the rationale behind its de-
cision and the breakdown of how it got from point A to point B,
51 Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin.,
626 F.3d 84, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2010); AT&T Wireless Servs. v. FCC, 270 F.3d 959, 968
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
52 AT&T, 270 F.3d at 968.





58 Id. at 759-60, 761 n. 2.
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there can be no assurance that the agency met its burden of
conducting an adequate review.
If the courts continue to allow unlimited deference to the de-
cision-making power of government agencies in these types of
matters, the rights and financial well being of the airlines and
other private entities stand to be harmed in pursuit of agency
self-interest. TSA's absolute adoption of the SH&E report and
rejection of the Campbell report, combined with its failure to
articulate any line of reasoning for doing so, opens the door to
suspicion that TSA never seriously entertained the DOT esti-
mate and thus followed its own self-interest in charging higher
fees.5" Though the issue of whether TSA complied with the nec-
essary procedure in determining the screening costs may appear
to be benign, it could lead to a slippery slope to unchecked gov-
ernment intrusion. If agencies are not required to actually show
a reasonable factual basis for how they arrive at the specific
amount of money they are charging in fees, then there is no
oversight to prevent abuse of the system. An agency has a self-
interest in charging the most it can, making meaningful over-
sight necessary to deter them from unjustly ignoring evidence
contrary to that interest. Ultimately courts should take a strong
stance against allowing unlimited deference to agency decisions
and require a full and complete articulation of the agency's rea-
soning, especially when they have the power to impose such a
large expense on private companies.
- Id.
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